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Abstract
This paper analyses the provision of auxiliary clinical services that are typically carried out
within the hospital. We estimate a exible cost function for the three most important (cost-
wise) diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services in Portuguese hospitals: Clinical Pathology,
Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation. Our objective in carrying out this
estimation is the evaluation of economies of scale and scope in the provision of these services.
For all services, we nd evidence of ray economies of scale and some evidence of economies
of scope. These results have important policy implications and can be related to the ongoing
discussion of where and how should hospitals provide these services.
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1 Introduction
Hospital e¢ ciency1 and cost structure2 has received over the yearswidespread attention in the
literature. The analysis of hospitalscost structure had an initial objective of (i) assessing economies
of scale and (ii) understanding the increasing trend in hospital costs (Cowing and Holtmann (1983)).
Grannemann et al. (1986) have added one further reason for the importance of hospitals cost
structure: changes in hospitalsreimbursement policies, particularly the introduction of prospective
payments. Knowledge of the cost structure is necessary in order to understand the incentives
underlying hospitalsoutput decisions under various reimbursement policies and, for policymakers,
this information is crucial in order to dene price levels and other details of the payment mechanism
(such as whether payment for services should be bundled or paid for on a service by service basis,
or whether di¤erent types of hospital should receive di¤erent prices). In addition to this, from
a competition policy perspective, especially when assessing mergers between hospitals, a good
understanding of the hospitalscost structure is necessary in order to evaluate potential merger-
related cost e¢ ciencies (Vita (1990), Preyra and Pink (2006)).
The analysis of hospital e¢ ciency has also been studied for a variety of reasons. Zuckerman et al.
(1994) note that under a prospective payment mechanism, some hospitals, theoretically those which
are more e¢ cient, have positive prot margins, while others, those which are less e¢ cient, do not.
In order to evaluate whether this relationship holds, a comparative assessment of hospital e¢ ciency
is necessary. In addition, the higher costs and worse outcomes of US hospitals (vis a vis other
OECD countries) raise important questions regarding their e¢ ciency. In particular, it becomes
important to understand whether managed care, which has had a role in cost containment, had
any impact on hospital e¢ ciency (Rosko (2001)). More recently, Herr (2008) has analysed whether
hospital ownership, patient structure or other factors, which cannot be considered inputs or outputs
of the production process, has an impact on hospital e¢ ciency.
And yet little is known about cost structures of services within the hospital. In particular, some
activities such as non-clinical services (e.g. car parking, computing, laundry, engineering, catering)
or clinical services (e.g. clinical pathology, medical imaging, pharmacy) are often considered inputs
of production (Cowing and Holtmann (1983), Vita (1990)), but little attention is paid to their own
production process. Given that such activities usually have a signicant weight in total costs, it is
surprising that more research on the topic has not been carried out.
Moreover, there is often pressure or need to outsource the provision of such activities, or at the
very least to benchmark their provision against private sector practices (Young (2005)). This is
particularly important in the light of Coases (1937) contribution to a proper understanding of the
1See, among others, Zuckerman, Hadley and Iezzoni (1994), Rosko and Chilingerian (1999), Rosko (2001), Staat
(2006) or Herr (2008).
2See, for example, Cowing and Holtmann (1983), Grannemann et al. (1986), Vitaliano (1987), Vita (1990),
Fournier and Mitchell (1992), Aletras (1999), Li and Rosenman (2001) or Preyra and Pink (2006).
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rm: in the provision of a particular service by a rm, it is important to compare the possibility of
in-house production with the use of the market as a resource allocation mechanism (outsourcing)
often dened as a make-or-buy decision. A body of literature has emerged looking in detail at
this dilemma, focusing on the role of transaction costs, asset specicity and incomplete contracts as
crucial elements to guide a rms make-or-buy decision (Williamson (1975, 1979, 1985), Grossman
and Hart (1986)). More recently, Grossman and Helpman (2002) have explicitly modelled these
trade-o¤s in a framework designed to analyse market structures, where integration and outsourcing
emerge as equilibrium phenomena. In doing so, Grossman and Helpman (2002) have moved
away from the typical bilateral relationship established between a single producer and supplier
and considered in more detail the interdependence between the choices of the various rms in an
industry. For example, outsourcing may be appealing for a rm if many rms provide an input it
needs and this depends on whether other rms have chosen to be vertically integrated or to also
outsource and buy inputs from others.
This paper is a contribution to a more detailed analysis of the trade-o¤s involved in the make-
or-buy decisions of some clinical services by hospitals. In particular, our objective is to shed some
light on an important reason for outsourcing: the existence of economies of scale. As Williamson
(1979) notes, by choosing to buy rather than make, and assuming transaction costs are negligible,
an external supplier may be in a better position to take advantage of scale economies through
aggregation of various rms demands. Or, viewed from a di¤erent perspective, if transaction
costs are signicant or if outsourcing to private sector contractors is a politically delicate decision,
in-house production may bring about benets to hospitals which enjoy economies of scale and it
may be sensible, in so far as possible, for such hospitals to aggregate the production which would
normally be carried out by other hospitals. Moreover, economies of scope may exist in the joint
provision of several services. For those cases, joint service production would bring about further
benets, whilst for services which do not benet from economies of scope, there is an economically
sound argument for them to be produced independently from others, possibly even outsourced.
In order to address these issues, we analyse the provision of auxiliary clinical services that
are typically carried out within the hospital by estimating a exible cost function for the three
most important (cost-wise) diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services in Portuguese hospitals:
Clinical Pathology, Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation.
Our objective in carrying out this estimation is the evaluation of economies of scale and scope in
the provision of these services. We use publicly available data from Portuguese hospitalsanalytical
cost accounting for the years 2002-2006. In addition, we have also collected information regarding
each individual hospital, such as the casemix index - a proxy for the complexity of clinical cases
treated - or the number of sta¤members. The estimation was carried out for a generalized translog
cost function, assuming that hospitals operated in the short-run, i.e. assuming that the quantity
used of some factors of production could not be easily changed. As is standard in the literature,
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we have estimated the cost function jointly with the cost share equations in order to improve the
quality of the estimation.
For Clinical Pathology and Medical Imaging, and when evaluating the cost function at the
sample mean, we nd evidence of ray economies of scale, i.e. as we increase the quantity produced
of each individual output, costs increase less than proportionally. For Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation, although a slightly di¤erent method was used to assess returns to scale, we also
nd that economies of scale appear to exist. We also nd that there is evidence of economies of
scope for some of the services provided within each category, but not for all of them. This suggests
that some services could be provided independently within each hospital without a¤ecting overall
costs. For instance, in Clinical Pathology, we found no evidence of economies of scope between
clinical chemistry - by far the most important (cost-wise) service within that category - and all
other outputs. Thus, outsourcing the provision of those services would have no cost implications in
the production of other outputs. By contrast, and in Imagiology, computed tomography exhibits
economies with all other outputs except one (ultrasonography), which suggests that if computed
tomography were to be outsourced, it would raise the costs of producing all other outputs (except
ultrasonography). In the case of Clinical Pathology, we nd that hospitals are under-dimensioned,
i.e. they have too little medical equipment (which we proxy by using the number of beds) for
the outputs they produce. The reverse is true for Medical Imaging: hospitals appear to be over-
dimensioned, i.e. they have too much hospital equipment for the outputs they produce.
These results have important policy implications and can be related to the ongoing discussion
of where and how should hospitals provide these services. For instance, they allow us to assess
the optimal hospital dimension for the provision of such auxiliary clinical services, as well as to
understand whether the joint production of some services is more e¢ cient than stand-alone pro-
duction. In addition, and at the very least, the results contribute to a more informed view of the
possible cost savings arising from aggregating production in fewer hospitals. Moreover, and in the
context of the Portuguese National Health Service, the existence of economies of scale may provide
a rationale for outsourcing particular services, even if they are to be provided by public or private
contractors within the hospital premises. Such a contractor could aggregate larger output levels
and take advantage of such economies of scale. This possibility is enshrined in article 10 of Law
27/2002, although, to the best of our knowledge, no Portuguese hospital has ever outsourced the
provision of clinical services in such a way. Finally, our results raise important questions associated
with the estimated lower costs of service provision by smaller (district and level 1) hospitals, even
after adjusting for casemix. This may well be evidence that, as Coase (1937) suggested, central
hospitals have surpassed their optimal size and are thus facing diminishing returns to manage-
ment3. If that is the case, our results suggest that cost reductions could be achieved if central
hospitals reorganized their provision of such services through the creation of smaller independent
3Coase (1937), pp. 394-95.
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service providing centres within the hospital, which could thus not be subject to such diminishing
returns to management.
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents the cost function to be estimated,
whilst Section 3 describes the data used. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
An appendix contains a sensitivity analysis of our results.
2 The econometric setup
The main economic concept at the heart of our analysis is the cost function. A rms long-run cost
function depends on the quantitites produced of the various outputs (yi), as well as on the input
prices (wi): Assuming there are n outputs and m inputs, a rms long-run cost function is given
by:
C = C (y1; :::; yn; w1; :::; wm) (1)
The short-run is dened as a period of time which is too short for the rm to be able to change
the quantity it uses of all its inputs. Typically, in the short-run there is at least one factor of
production whose quantity the rm cannot easily change. If we dene the quantity of this factor
to be k; then a rms short-run cost function will be given by:
CS = CS (y1; :::; yn; w1; :::; wm; k) (2)
Because xed factors of production necessarily lead to the existence of xed costs, the short-run
cost function can also be written as:
CS = V C (y;wv) + F (3)
where V C represents variable costs (i.e. costs associated with the inputs which the rm can
vary in the short-run), wv is the vector of all input prices except input k, y =(y1; :::; yn) is the
output vector and F = wkk is the xed cost of production.
We make the assumption that hospitals operate in the short-run. This implies that we believe
hospitals cannot easily change the quantity they use of all the factors of production, in response
to a change in input prices or output levels. We use the generalized translog cost function to
represent the variable cost function. This is a generalization of the translog cost function and
it is appropriate when a signicant number of observations has zero output levels: a Box-Cox
transformation of the output levels is used instead of the usual (under the translog cost function)
log-transformation. Therefore, output levels yi are transformed into Yi =
yi  1
 :
4 Similarly to other
4We assume  = 0:1: The appendix contains a sensitivity analysis for di¤erent values of : Our results appear to
be robust for di¤erent values of .
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exible functional forms for the cost function, such as the quadratic cost function or the translog
cost function, the generalized translog represents a second-order Taylor approximation to the true
(but unknown) functional form of a di¤erentiable cost function. The equation representing the
generalized translog cost function is:
lnV C = 0 +
nX
i=1
iYi +
1
2
nX
i=1
nX
j=1
ijYiYj +
+
mX
i=1
i ln (wi) +
1
2
mX
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nX
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i=1
Ki: ln(k):Yi + " (4)
where wi represents the price of input i; n is the total number of outputs and m is the total
number of inputs. We assume a symmetry constraint, ij = ji and ij = ji; as well as linear
homogeneity in input prices (i.e. doubling the price of all inputs leads to a doubling of costs):
mX
i=1
i = 1
mX
i=1
ri = 0; r = 1; :::; n
mX
j=1
ij = 0; i = 1; :::;m
mX
i=1
Ki = 0 (5)
Shephards Lemma allows us to obtain the cost share equations through logarithmic di¤erenti-
ation of the cost functions:
Si =
@ lnV C
@ lnwi
= i +
mX
j=1
ij ln (wj) +
nX
r=1
ri:Yr + Ki: ln(k); i = 1; :::;m (6)
where Si = wi:ximP
i=1
wi:xi
is the cost share of input i (xi represents the quantity used of input i):
The Box-Cox transformation is applied to the output data (yi); but prior to that we mean-scale
all our variables (described in detail in the next section). As we will see, we identify two inputs for
production: sta¤ and other inputs. We then estimate the generalized translog cost function given
by equations (4) and (6) in the following way:
 Model 1: equations (4) and (6) were estimated with the homogeneity restrictions of equation
(5) using Zellners Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. Because the cost shares
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add up to unity, only one of them is independent. Therefore, the second cost share equation
(associated with non-sta¤ costs) was omitted from the regression.
 Model 2: similar to model 1, but only one input price was used - sta¤ unit costs. In this
scenario, the unit price of other variable inputs is implicitly used as the numeraire and there-
fore linear homogeneity is assumed to hold. Therefore, equations (4) and (6) were estimated
using Zellners Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique. Because the cost shares
add up to unity, only one of them is independent. Therefore, the second cost share equation
(associated with non-sta¤ costs) was omitted from the regression.
Both models were estimated using two variants:
 a rst variant made use of pooled data, i.e. assuming that all observations were independent
from one another, and imposed no restrictions on the model;
 a second variant made use of pooled data, i.e. assuming that all observations were independent
from one another, but imposed restrictions on the model, namely (i) homotheticity of the
production function and (ii) no dummy variable e¤ects (e.g. hospital type, year or region).
The underlying rationale for the second variant is the possible existence of multicollinearity,
i.e. correlations between the explanatory variables. For instance, the dummy variables described
above may well be correlated, because, say, central hospitals, which typically present larger casemix
indicators, are located in Portugals two largest cities: Lisbon and Porto. For the same reason, we
make the assumption that the production function is homothetic. As Smet (2002) notes, this
implies that the mix of inputs which minimizes costs is not a¤ected by the volume or even the
mix of outputs. Therefore, changes in input prices will a¤ect costs by a scale factor. In practice,
homotheticity implies that ri = 0; 8r; i; in equation (4), i.e. input prices are not interacted
with output levels. Hopefully, the imposition of this restriction alleviates possible multicollinearity
problems. We report the result of a test of homotheticity for all regressions in Section 4.1.
3 Data
Portuguese hospitals in the National Health Service report their cost breakdown yearly to a central
body (IGIF/ACSS). This cost breakdown allows for the identication of costs associated with the
main hospital outputs (medical and surgical discharges, outpatient care, emergency room care,
etc), as well as with auxiliary services, such as diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services5.
These costs are further broken down by specialty and cost type (sta¤, materials and supplies, etc).
The main database we have used consists of all the statistical information pertaining diagnostic
5The quantities produced by each hospital of the various outputs and/or diagnostic techniques and therapeutic
services are also provided.
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techniques and therapeutic services in Portuguese hospitals between 2002 and 2006 (IGIF/ACSS
(2004a, 2004c, 2006a, 2006c, 2007b)).
In addition, we have collected data related to the total number of sta¤ in each hospital, the
number of beds, the casemix index6, total sta¤ costs and total hospital costs for each year. For the
years 2002-2004, all the information was collected from the yearly National Health Service report
published by IGIF/ACSS (IGIF/ACSS (2004b, 2005, 2006b)). For the years 2005 and 2006, all
the information except the number of sta¤ was collected from the yearly National Health Service
report (IGIF/ACSS (2007a, 2008)) and from the yearly report on EPE hospitals (public but
autonomous hospitals of the National Health Service) (IGIF/ACSS (2007c)). Sta¤ numbers for
2005 and 2006 were collected from a yearly statistical yearbook produced by DGS (2006, 2007).
Among the various diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services carried out at Portuguese
hospitals, clinical pathology, medical imaging and physical medicine and rehabilitation have a
signicant weight in overall costs7. Within each of these specialties, some procedures stand out in
terms of their share of total costs. For instance, as we can see from Table 1, Clinical Chemistry
is the procedure responsible for 57% of the total costs of Clinical Pathology. Similarly, Radiology
accounts for some 74% of total Medical Imaging costs and Physical therapy accounts for 60% of
total Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation costs.
Due to the large variety of data sources used, some variables had a signicant number of missing
observations. Therefore, we have eliminated observations which reported missing or zero quantities
of the above specialties of diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services when total costs were
available8, observations with a missing casemix index and observations with missing total sta¤
numbers. We have also not considered psychiatric hospitals and oncology hospitals. This has
reduced the total number of observations available for Clinical Pathology to 320 (from 357), to 335
(from 365) for Medical Imaging and to 288 (from 333) for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation.
In addition, the data on Clinical Pathology showed the presence of signicant outliers at the top of
the distribution. Therefore, the top 1% of the distribution (3 observations) was dropped, leaving
us with 317 observations.
In the short-run, we expect equipment to constitute a xed factor of production, which hospitals
could not easily (or rapidly) vary. However, we had no data available on hospital equipment.
Therefore, we have used the number of beds as a proxy for the equipment available in each hospital
(k). It appears reasonable that avaliable equipment for auxiliary medical services such as diagnostic
techniques and therapeutic services is purchased as a function of the hospital dimension. The
number of beds also captures the potential demand for the services, which are mostly provided to
6The casemix index for the years 2005 and 2006 for EPEhospitals was not publicly available. In those cases,
and because the casemix index does not change signicantly over time, we have assumed that those hospitalscasemix
index was equal to that of the most recently available year.
7 In 2004, they accounted for 56% of the total costs of diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services.
8 In other words, we have not considered observations for which there was clearly misreported output production.
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Specialty Procedure Variable Cost (€m)
Percentage of
total specialty
cost
Number of
observations
(Weighted) Unit
cost (€)
Clinical Pathology Clinical chemistry y1 569.3 57% 340 2.62
Clinical Pathology Clinical hematology y2 130.5 13% 198 3.16
Clinical Pathology Immunology y3 103.6 10% 164 7.35
Clinical Pathology Clinical microbiology y4 82.6 8% 165 10.36
Clinical Pathology Endocrinology y5 29.7 3% 52 9.89
Clinical Pathology Virology y6 17.4 2% 37 9.54
Clinical Pathology Clinical hematology/Hematoncology y7 59.8 6% 26 6.28
Medical Imaging Radiology y1 475.6 74% 356 17.58
Medical Imaging Angiography y2 54.9 9% 49 134.92
Medical Imaging Mamography y3 6.4 1% 80 39.96
Medical Imaging Computed tomography y4 60.2 9% 109 19.10
Medical Imaging Ultrasonography y5 25.8 4% 187 12.11
Medical Imaging Magnetic resonance imaging y6 16.0 3% 35 33.87
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Electrotherapy y1 47.7 24% 85 4.53
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Physical therapy y2 121.6 60% 263 5.17
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Hydro-kinesiotherapy y3 4.1 2% 32 4.74
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Occupational therapy y4 16.4 8% 65 8.76
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Speech and language therapy y5 12.2 6% 57 22.45
Note: This table excludes all missing observations
Table 1: Descriptive cost statistics for Clinical Pathology, Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine
and Rehabilitation in Portuguese hospitals: 2002-2006
admitted patients.
In addition to the variables described earlier, we have expanded the model with additional
dummy variables which could explain di¤erences in costs:
 dummy variables representing the hospital type - hospitals are divided in three hierarchichal
categories: central, district and level 1 hospitals; therefore, a dummy variable was created
taking on the value of 1 for the latter two categories (central hospitals were omitted): D -
district hospitaland D - Level 1 hospital;
 dummy variables for each year (except 2002, which was omitted): D - 2003; D - 2004;
D - 2005; D - 2006;
 dummy variables representing the region where the hospital is located - there are 5 regions
in Portugal and a dummy variable was created for four of those regions (the Alentejo region
was omitted): D - Region Algarve; D - Region Centro; D - Region L. V. Tejo(which
includes Portugals capital and largest city - Lisbon); D - Region Norte (which includes
Portugals second largest city - Porto);
For each specialty (Clinical Pathology, Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine and Rehabilita-
tion), total costs were broken down into sta¤ costs, pharmaceutical products, clinical consumables,
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Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
VC (€) 2,332,378 3,019,846 1,290,709 1,598,582 491,196 437,423
y1 654,030 814,234 74,768 83,707 33,954 110,782
y2 120,629 357,442 1,202 12,304 75,060 74,283
y3 42,222 232,640 398 1,241 2,245 12,397
y4 24,252 53,499 9,231 47,832 3,831 16,920
y5 7,934 58,952 6,110 11,083 1,636 13,161
y6 5,133 60,917 1,358 12,746 n/a n/a
y7 23,762 171,947 n/a n/a n/a n/a
w1 (€) 26,681 4,516 26,478 4,552 26,549 4,675
w2 (€) 1.88 1.16 5.54 6.35 1.71 5.27
k 293.8 270.3 285.4 268.2 307.1 275.0
Casemix 1.04 0.33 1.05 0.34 1.05 0.32
Clinical Pathology Medical Imaging Physical Medicine &Rehabilitation
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regressions
depreciation, other expenses and indirect costs. For each observation, variable costs were obtained
by subtracting indirect costs and depreciation from total costs.
We have assumed that diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services relied on the use of two
variable inputs: sta¤ and other inputs. Sta¤ units costs (w1) were calculated by dividing total hos-
pital sta¤ costs with the total number of sta¤. Non-sta¤ inputs are a composite of pharmaceutical
products, clinical consumables and other expenses, for which a unit price is di¢ cult to nd. We
follow Garcia and Thomas (2001) and assume that the price of these non-sta¤ inputs is represented
by a unit cost (w2), which was calculated by dividing the total cost of non-sta¤ related variable
costs by the total quantity produced in each specialty. Therefore, the unit cost of other inputs is
an imperfect measure for the price of other inputs, as it is expressed as a cost per unit of output.
Table 2 contains the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in our regressions.
4 Results
The results of the estimation of equation (4) are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5, corresponding,
respectively, to clinical pathology, medical imaging and physical medicine and rehabilitation. We
only present the results for the cost function - the cost share equation improves the quality of the
results, but its coe¢ cients are (as we can see by looking at equations (4) and (6)) the same as in
the cost function.
4.1 Economies of scale
Ray economies of scale, in a multiproduct cost function setting, refer to the proportional increase
in total costs which result from a proportional increase in all the outputs. Alternatively, viewed
from the production function perspective, ray economies of scale refer to the proportional increase
in outputs which result from proportional increases in the quantity used of all inputs. Inevitably,
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Parameter Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Parameter Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Y1 0.767 *** 0.831 *** 1.001 *** 1.146 *** Y1.ln(w1) 0.005 0.011 ***
Y2 -0.060 0.044 -0.151 -0.046 Y2.ln(w1) 0.005 ** 0.005 ***
Y3 0.059 * 0.058 0.026 0.023 Y3.ln(w1) -0.003 -0.004 **
Y4 0.123 0.111 0.262 0.263 Y4.ln(w1) 0.000 -0.001
Y5 0.021 0.041 0.054 0.086 Y5.ln(w1) -0.002 -0.002
Y6 -0.040 ** -0.032 -0.043 -0.025 Y6.ln(w1) 0.002 0.001
Y7 -0.003 0.001 -0.043 -0.044 Y7.ln(w1) -0.001 -0.003
ln(w1) 0.418 *** 0.423 *** 0.416 *** 0.447 *** Y1.ln(w2) -0.005
ln(w2) 0.582 *** 0.577 *** Y2.ln(w2) -0.005 **
Y1.Y1 0.053 *** 0.062 *** 0.021 *** 0.034 *** Y3.ln(w2) 0.003
Y1.Y2 -0.016 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 ** -0.005 Y4.ln(w2) 0.000
Y1.Y3 -0.007 -0.012 ** 0.011 0.002 Y5.ln(w2) 0.002
Y1.Y4 -0.018 *** -0.021 *** -0.009 -0.012 Y6.ln(w2) -0.002
Y1.Y5 0.011 0.011 0.026 0.030 Y7.ln(w2) 0.001
Y1.Y6 0.002 0.005 0.017 0.021 ln(k) 0.040 -0.163 -0.511 -0.834
Y1.Y7 0.032 *** 0.037 *** 0.038 ** 0.045 ** (lnk)
2
0.175 *** 0.173 *** 0.285 *** 0.272 ***
Y2.Y2 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.004 0.004 ln(k).ln(w1) -0.054 *** -0.050 *** -0.056 *** -0.044 ***
Y2.Y3 -0.007 -0.007 -0.027 *** -0.026 *** ln(k).ln(w2) 0.054 *** 0.050 ***
Y2.Y4 0.006 0.010 * 0.013 0.020 * ln(k).Y1 -0.187 *** -0.206 *** -0.209 *** -0.235 ***
Y2.Y5 -0.003 -0.002 0.009 0.009 ln(k).Y2 0.012 * 0.013 0.018 0.014
Y2.Y6 -0.011 -0.007 -0.019 -0.016 ln(k).Y3 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.021
Y2.Y7 -0.003 -0.003 0.007 0.007 ln(k).Y4 -0.001 0.000 -0.029 ** -0.027 *
Y3.Y3 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.002 0.002 ln(k).Y5 -0.017 -0.025 ** -0.051 ** -0.066 ***
Y3.Y4 0.001 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 ln(k).Y6 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009
Y3.Y5 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 ln(k).Y7 -0.033 *** -0.034 ** -0.085 *** -0.090 ***
Y3.Y6 0.002 ** 0.002 * 0.003 0.004 D - District hosp. -0.092 *** -0.247 ***
Y3.Y7 -0.003 -0.005 ** -0.005 -0.008 ** D - Level 1 hosp. -0.102 *** -0.304 ***
Y4.Y4 0.003 0.004 * 0.007 0.008 * D - Year 2003 -0.073 *** -0.071
Y4.Y5 -0.002 -0.002 -0.012 -0.013 D - Year 2004 -0.062 ** -0.021
Y4.Y6 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.001 D - Year 2005 -0.051 * -0.031
Y4.Y7 0.007 0.004 0.032 ** 0.030 * D - Year 2006 -0.047 * -0.005
Y5.Y5 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 0.009 * 0.011 ** D - Region Algarve 0.123 ** 0.216 **
Y5.Y6 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 D - Region Centro -0.130 *** -0.248 ***
Y5.Y7 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 D - Region L. V. Tejo 0.089 ** 0.086
Y6.Y6 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.002 D - Region Norte -0.120 *** -0.225 ***
Y6.Y7 -0.003 ** -0.003 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** Casemix -0.069 ** 0.057 -0.081 0.149 **
Y7.Y7 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.001 Constant 14.601 *** 14.388 *** 14.552 *** 14.108 ***
ln(w1).ln(w1) 0.017 *** 0.029 *** 0.004 0.002
ln(w1).ln(w2) -0.035 *** -0.058 ***
ln(w2).ln(w2) 0.017 *** 0.029 *** Number of observations 317 317 317 317
R2 (cost function) 0.9834 0.9736 0.9314 0.915
R2 (cost share equation) 0.2112 0.1963 0.1905 0.141
(***) Significant at the 1% level; (**) Significant at the 5% level; (*) Significant at the 10% level
Only one input price Both input prices Only one input price
(2) Pooled
data
(2) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(1) Pooled
data
(1) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(1) Pooled
data
(1) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) Pooled
data
(2) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
Both input prices
Clinical Pathology Clinical Pathology
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7
g1
g 2
b12
b13
b14
b15
b16
b17
b23
b24
b25
b26
b27
b34
b35
b36
b37
b45
b46
b47
b56
b57
b67
1 2+ b33
1 2+ b44
1 2+ b55
1 2+ b66
1 2+ b22
1 2+ b11
1 2+ b77
1 2+ Ag11
1 2+ g22
g12
d11
d21
d31
d41
d51
d61
d71
d12
d22
d32
d42
d52
d62
d72
bK
1 2+ bKK
sK1
sK2
qK1
qK2
qK3
qK4
qK5
qK6
qK7
a0
Table 3: Results: Clinical Pathology
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Parameter Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Parameter Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Y1 0.458 *** 0.678 *** 0.611 *** 0.824 *** Y1.ln(w2) 0.032 ***
Y2 0.025 0.058 0.128 ** 0.182 *** Y2.ln(w2) 0.001
Y3 0.069 * 0.086 ** 0.116 ** 0.139 ** Y3.ln(w2) -0.003 *
Y4 -0.066 -0.171 ** -0.371 *** -0.543 *** Y4.ln(w2) 0.002
Y5 0.027 0.038 -0.052 -0.070 Y5.ln(w2) 0.001
Y6 0.063 * 0.037 0.088 0.088 Y6.ln(w2) -0.002
ln(w1) 0.601 *** 0.604 *** 0.608 *** 0.647 *** ln(k) 0.228 *** 0.202 ** 0.326 ** 0.337 **
ln(w2) 0.399 *** 0.396 *** (lnk)
2
0.167 *** 0.224 *** 0.216 *** 0.305 ***
Y1.Y1 0.040 *** 0.038 *** 0.015 ** 0.010 * ln(k).ln(w1) 0.008 -0.021 *** -0.034 *** -0.064 ***
Y1.Y2 0.025 0.021 0.040 0.030 ln(k).ln(w2) -0.008 0.021 ***
Y1.Y3 -0.007 -0.001 0.008 0.019 ln(k).Y1 -0.139 *** -0.180 *** -0.143 *** -0.182 ***
Y1.Y4 -0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.006 ln(k).Y2 0.017 0.025 0.012 0.020
Y1.Y5 -0.006 -0.015 *** -0.007 -0.015 ** ln(k).Y3 -0.005 0.005 -0.025 * -0.007
Y1.Y6 -0.011 0.010 0.008 0.039 ln(k).Y4 -0.007 -0.016 * -0.001 -0.008
Y2.Y2 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.014 ** ln(k).Y5 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 * -0.011
Y2.Y3 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 ln(k).Y6 -0.035 -0.048 * -0.047 -0.065
Y2.Y4 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 D - District hosp. -0.189 *** -0.217 ***
Y2.Y5 -0.022 ** -0.033 *** -0.046 *** -0.061 *** D - Level 1 hosp. -0.001 0.160 *
Y2.Y6 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 D - Year 2003 -0.024 -0.007
Y3.Y3 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.009 D - Year 2004 0.014 0.057
Y3.Y4 0.002 * 0.000 0.004 ** 0.001 D - Year 2005 0.020 0.072
Y3.Y5 -0.007 -0.009 -0.010 -0.015 D - Year 2006 0.033 0.131 **
Y3.Y6 0.004 * 0.004 0.004 0.003 D - Region Algarve 0.027 0.018
Y4.Y4 0.001 0.000 -0.008 -0.006 D - Region Centro -0.115 ** -0.187 **
Y4.Y5 0.002 * 0.002 0.004 *** 0.004 ** D - Region L. V. Tejo 0.055 0.067
Y4.Y6 -0.007 -0.016 * -0.028 ** -0.045 *** D - Region Norte -0.198 *** -0.292 ***
Y5.Y5 0.013 *** 0.017 *** 0.010 *** 0.015 *** Casemix -0.227 *** -0.062 -0.140 0.053
Y5.Y6 0.017 * 0.028 ** 0.039 ** 0.053 *** Constant 14.564 *** 14.132 *** 14.814 *** 14.358 ***
Y6.Y6 0.006 * 0.005 0.009 0.010
ln(w1).ln(w1) 0.066 *** 0.063 *** 0.004 0.016
ln(w1).ln(w2) -0.133 *** -0.126 *** Number of observations 335 335 335 335
ln(w2).ln(w2) 0.066 *** 0.063 *** R
2 (cost function) 0.960 0.940 0.913 0.893
Y1.ln(w1) -0.032 *** -0.012 ** R
2 (cost share equation) 0.499 0.438 0.180 0.148
Y2.ln(w1) -0.001 -0.003
Y3.ln(w1) 0.003 * 0.001
Y4.ln(w1) -0.002 -0.006 **
Y5.ln(w1) -0.001 0.003
Y6.ln(w1) 0.002 0.001
(***) Significant at the 1% level; (**) Significant at the 5% level; (*) Significant at the 10% level
Both input prices Only one input price Both input prices Only one input price
(1) Pooled
data
(1) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) Pooled
data
(2) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(1) Pooled
data
(1) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
Medical ImagingMedical Imaging
(2) Pooled
data
(2) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b6
b7g1
g 2
b12
b13
b14
b15
b16
b17
b23
b24
b25
b26
b27
b34
b35
b36
b37
b45
b46
b47
b56
b57
b67
1 2+ b33
1 2+ b44
1 2+ b55
1 2+ b66
1 2+ b22
1 2+ b11
1 2+ b77Ag11
1 2+ g22
g12
d11
d21
d31
d41
d51
d61
d12
d22
d32
d42
d52
d62
bK
1 2+ bKK
sK1
sK2
qK1
qK2
qK3
qK4
qK5
qK6
a0
Table 4: Results: Medical Imaging
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Parameter Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Parameter Variable Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
Y1 0.049 0.062 -0.074 -0.065 Y1.ln(w2) 0.004
Y2 -0.143 -0.110 -0.305 -0.253 Y2.ln(w2) 0.011 ***
Y3 -0.010 -0.022 -0.028 -0.037 Y3.ln(w2) -0.002
Y4 0.039 0.054 0.020 0.067 Y4.ln(w2) -0.007 **
Y5 0.069 0.096 * 0.069 0.099 Y5.ln(w2) 0.002
ln(w1) 0.680 *** 0.673 *** 0.766 *** 0.782 *** ln(k) 0.544 *** 0.388 ** 0.847 *** 0.537 **
ln(w2) 0.320 *** 0.327 *** (lnk)
2
0.071 *** 0.021 0.078 ** 0.021
Y1.Y1 0.003 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 ln(k).ln(w1) -0.012 -0.004 -0.008 0.010
Y1.Y2 -0.034 *** -0.036 *** -0.033 *** -0.032 *** ln(k).ln(w2) 0.012 0.004
Y1.Y3 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 ln(k).Y1 0.005 -0.001 0.015 0.005
Y1.Y4 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.001 ln(k).Y2 -0.017 -0.012 0.001 0.001
Y1.Y5 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 0.000 ln(k).Y3 0.022 0.015 0.020 0.008
Y2.Y2 0.037 *** 0.036 *** 0.022 ** 0.022 ** ln(k).Y4 -0.013 -0.007 -0.028 * -0.021
Y2.Y3 -0.016 ** -0.018 *** -0.012 -0.012 ln(k).Y5 0.014 0.006 0.031 0.020
Y2.Y4 -0.018 -0.011 -0.027 -0.020 D - District hosp. 0.075 0.095
Y2.Y5 -0.021 *** -0.021 *** -0.016 ** -0.015 ** D - Level 1 hosp. -0.025 0.052
Y3.Y3 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 D - Year 2003 -0.050 -0.014
Y3.Y4 -0.005 -0.006 * -0.001 -0.002 D - Year 2004 0.016 0.059
Y3.Y5 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.005 D - Year 2005 0.007 0.040
Y4.Y4 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.007 D - Year 2006 0.017 0.085
Y4.Y5 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 D - Region Algarve 0.098 0.087
Y5.Y5 0.011 ** 0.012 ** 0.014 ** 0.015 ** D - Region Centro -0.300 *** -0.433 ***
ln(w1).ln(w1) 0.048 *** 0.050 *** -0.045 -0.061 ** D - Region L. V. Tejo 0.030 0.020
ln(w1).ln(w2) -0.095 *** -0.100 *** D - Region Norte -0.227 *** -0.292 **
ln(w2).ln(w2) 0.048 *** 0.050 *** Casemix 0.388 *** 0.500 *** 0.495 *** 0.645 ***
Y1.ln(w1) -0.004 -0.006 * Constant 12.835 *** 12.684 *** 12.440 *** 12.248 ***
Y2.ln(w1) -0.011 *** -0.015 ***
Y3.ln(w1) 0.002 0.000
Y4.ln(w1) 0.007 ** 0.012 *** Number of observations 288 288 288 288
Y5.ln(w1) -0.002 -0.004 R
2 (cost function) 0.903 0.881 0.812 0.787
R2 (cost share equation) 0.626 0.609 0.082 0.005
(***) Significant at the 1% level; (**) Significant at the 5% level; (*) Significant at the 10% level
Both input prices Only one input price Both input prices Only one input price
(1) Pooled
data
(1) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(1) Pooled
data
(1) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) Pooled
data
(2) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation
Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation
(2) Pooled
data
(2) Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homothetic
b1
b2
b3
b4
b5
b67g1
g 2
b12
b13
b14
b15
b167
b23
b24
b25
b267
b34
b35
b367
b45
b467
b5676
1 2+ b33
1 2+ b44
1 2+ b55
1 2+ b66
1 2+ b22
1 2+ b11
77Ag11
1 2+ g22
g12
d11
d21
d31
d41
d51
d12
d22
d32
d42
d52
d62bK
1 2+ bKK
sK1
sK2
qK1
qK2
qK3
qK4
qK5
a0
Table 5: Results: Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
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any concept of economies of scale implicitly refers to the long run. Vita (1990) points out that
when a variable cost function is estimated, ray economies of scale (RTS) can be calculated in the
following way (see also Braeutigam and Daughety (1983)):
RTS =
1  @ lnV C@ ln(k)
nP
i=1
i
(7)
where i is the cost elasticity of output i :
i =
@C
@yi
yi
C
(8)
i represents the percentual change in costs when output i varies by 1%. In our case, and
similarly to Vita (1990), the cost elasticity of input i is given by:
i =
0@i + nX
j=1
ijYj +
mX
j=1
ij ln (wj) + Ki ln (k)
1A yi (9)
where yi is the untransformed output and  represents the Box-Cox parameter used in the
transformation. At the sample mean, because we have mean scaled our data prior to the Box-Cox
transformation, the cost elasticity of output i is simply given by i = i; where i is the output
parameter from the estimated cost function (equation (4)). An estimate of RTS in equation (7)
larger than one indicates the existence of economies of scale. In particular, an increase of all the
outputs in an average hospital by 1% would increase variable costs by 1=RTS percent.
In equation (7), k should ideally represent the optimal level for the xed factor. However,
the calculation of this optimal level for the xed factor would require the use of input price data
which we do not possess. Therefore, we follow the approach suggested by Caves et al. (1981)
and also used by Vita (1990), and use the actual level of the xed factor (instead of the optimal
level) when computing equation (7). As Vita (1990, p. 15) notes, this method ...evaluates scale
economies along a ray from the origin that passes through the actual point of operation observed
in the sample. Since we are estimating a variable cost function, we are implicitly assuming that
rms are not operating on their e¢ cient expansion path, i.e. they are not using the optimal level
of the xed factor. Therefore, it is likely that the two methods for computing equation (7) would
yield di¤erent results (see Vita (1990) for a more detailed discussion).
As we can see from the estimates of RTS (equation (7)) at the sample mean presented in Table
6, the results for models 1 and 2 under no restrictions (rst and third columns) are rather plausible
for Clinical Pathology and Medical Imaging. For instance, for Clinical Pathology, the estimate of
RTS for models 1 and 2 is 1.11 and 1.37 respectively. Both results suggest the existence of ray
economies of scale. Similarly, for Medical Imaging, the estimate of RTS for models 1 and 2 is 1.34
and 1.30 respectively. Again, both suggest the existence of ray economies of scale.
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Ray economies of scale
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
Clinical Pathology 1.11 1.10 1.37 1.31
Medical Imaging 1.34 1.10 1.30 1.07
RTS
Table 6: Ray economies of scale
Ray economies of scale: Clinical
Pathology
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
All Yi 20% above sample mean 1.05 1.05 1.30 1.24
All Yi 10% above sample mean 1.08 1.07 1.33 1.27
At sample mean (all variables) 1.11 1.10 1.37 1.31
All Yi 10% below sample mean 1.14 1.14 1.41 1.35
All Yi 20% below sample mean 1.17 1.18 1.45 1.40
RTS
Table 7: Ray economies of scale above and below sample mean - Clinical Pathology
Imposing the two restrictions referred to earlier - (i) homotheticity of the production function
and (ii) no dummy variable e¤ects - (second and fourth columns) changes the estimate of RTS in
model 1 marginally for Clinical Pathology (from 1.11 to 1.10)9, but more signicantly for model
2 (from 1.37 to 1.31) and for both models in Medical Imaging (from 1.34 to 1.10 in model 1
and from 1.30 to 1.07 in model 2). This is undoubtedly related to the plausibility of imposing
the homotheticity assumption in the rst place. A Wald test of the restrictions associated with
homotheticity of the production function shows that it cannot be rejected (at a 1% signicance
level) only for model 1 in Clinical Pathology; for both models in Medical Imaging and for model
2 in Clinical Pathology, homotheticity is rejected. As such, the results of the restricted models
should be interpreted with great caution.
For Clinical Pathology and Medical Imaging, we have also calculated the returns to scale indi-
cator for di¤erent levels of output (assuming all other variables are at the sample mean, including
the number of beds). Tables 7 and 8 present those estimates. Rather importantly, we can see that
ray economies of scale are less pronounced as we increase the level of output above the sample
mean. This is to be expected, as an increase of all output levels would partly exhaust the existing
economies of scale. The reverse is true when we decrease the output levels below the sample mean.
For Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, the estimates of RTS at the sample mean are im-
plausible and exhibit a wide variability across models. Our conjecture is that the sample mean for
all outputs may not be the most appropriate scale to evaluate ray economies of scale in Physical
Medicine and Rehabiliation. Looking at Table 9, we can see that in Clinical Pathology and Med-
9The homotheticity restriction cannot be rejected at a 1% signicance level for model 1, but it is rejected for
model 2.
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Ray economies of scale: Medical
Imaging
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
All Yi 20% above sample mean 1.27 1.04 1.24 1.03
All Yi 10% above sample mean 1.30 1.07 1.27 1.05
At sample mean (all variables) 1.34 1.10 1.30 1.07
All Yi 10% below sample mean 1.38 1.13 1.33 1.10
All Yi 20% below sample mean 1.43 1.17 1.36 1.13
RTS
Table 8: Ray economies of scale above and below sample mean - Medical Imaging
Specialty Procedure Variable Number of 0-observations
Number of
positive
observations
Total number
of
observations
Total number of
observations within
0.5 and 1.5 of sample
mean
Percentage of
observations within
0.5 and 1.5 of
sample mean
Clinical Pathology Clinical chemistry y1 7 310 317 127 40%
Clinical Pathology Clinical hematology y2 141 176 317 54 17%
Clinical Pathology Immunology y3 170 147 317 37 12%
Clinical Pathology Clinical microbiology y4 169 148 317 53 17%
Clinical Pathology Endocrinology y5 280 37 317 4 1%
Clinical Pathology Virology y6 287 30 317 6 2%
Clinical Pathology Clinical hematology/Hematoncology y7 300 17 317 2 1%
Medical Imaging Radiology y1 5 330 335 137 41%
Medical Imaging Angiography y2 288 47 335 11 3%
Medical Imaging Mamography y3 260 75 335 9 3%
Medical Imaging Computed tomography y4 231 104 335 55 16%
Medical Imaging Ultrasonography y5 154 181 335 65 19%
Medical Imaging Magnetic resonance imaging y6 304 31 335 4 1%
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Electrotherapy y1 212 76 288 12 4%
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Physical therapy y2 44 244 288 120 42%
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Hydro-kinesiotherapy y3 259 29 288 6 2%
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Occupational therapy y4 240 48 288 12 4%
Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation Speech and language therapy y5 237 51 288 18 6%
Table 9: Sample summary
ical Imaging, a signicant percentage of observations (more than 10%) contains output production
within 0.5 and 1.5 of the sample mean, and this is true for several outputs. By contrast, in Physi-
cal Medicine and Rehabilitation, output production within 0.5 and 1.5 of the sample mean is only
considerable for physical therapy; for all other outputs, there is a large number of 0-observations
and few (less than 6%) are within that interval.
Therefore, we have used the estimates presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5 to calculate an RTS
estimate for each observation. In other words, we have estimated RTS from equation (7) using the
actual level of the explanatory variables associated with each observation (which may be clearly
di¤erent from the sample mean). Naturally, such estimates must be interpreted with caution
because, as Vita (1990) notes, estimated exible cost functions perform poorly when evaluated
away from the approximation point. Nevertheless, and in order to correct this problem, we present
in Table 10 the median of all individually calculated RTS estimates10. In addition, we have also
10Our results indicate that the mean of the individually estimated RTS estimates is heavily inuenced by very high
and very low RTS estimates, which are clearly related to their distance from the approximation point. Therefore, we
have chosen to present the median of such estimates, which is not inuenced by their magnitude.
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Ray economies of scale (individual observations)
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
Clinical Pathology Median - per observation 1.24 1.19 1.70 1.38
Median - per hospital 1.20 1.17 1.63 1.33
Medical Imaging Median - per observation 1.13 1.07 1.05 1.18
Median - per hospital 1.12 1.02 0.95 1.19
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation Median - per observation 1.22 1.14 1.28 1.27
Median - per hospital 1.23 1.16 1.23 1.29
RTS
Table 10: Ray economies of scale - individual observations
calculated the mean RTS estimate for each hospital (each hospital may have a di¤erent number of
observations in the panel) and then calculated the median of such hospitalsRTS estimates.
Firstly, notice that the estimates for Clinical Pathology and Medical Imaging are not too dif-
ferent from those presented in Table 6: for Clinical Pathology, these estimates are slightly larger,
whereas for Medical Imaging they are slightly lower. Nevertheless, with one single exception (me-
dian per hospital of Medical Imaging) they all suggest the existence of economies of scale in these
two specialties.
As for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, the RTS estimates also suggest the existence of
economies of scale. More importantly, such estimates do not vary signicantly across models or
depending on the calculation method (median per observation or median per hospital) and range
from 1.14 to 1.29.
In conclusion, there are some benets from aggregating production across hospitals (which leads
to an increase in the output produced), but nothing particularly surprising or strong. In the case of
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, doubling the size (i.e. doubling the amount produced of all
outputs) reduces average costs by 6-11%(roughly speaking). A similar conclusion holds for Clinical
Pathology and Medical Imaging, as the estimates of RTS (see Table 6) are not too di¤erent from
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation.
4.2 Optimal number of beds
Following Preyra and Pink (2006), we can try and infer the optimal relationship between the number
of beds (which we have used as a proxy for hospital equipment) and output. First, we di¤erentiate
the short run cost function with respect to ln (k) and equate to zero:
@ lnV C
@ ln (k)
= K + KK ln (k) +
mX
i=1
Ki: ln (wi) +
nX
i=1
Ki:Yi = 0 (10)
which is equivalent to:
ln (k) =
 K  
Pm
i=1 Ki: ln (wi) 
Pn
i=1 Ki:Yi
KK
(11)
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(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data - no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
Clinical Pathology 262 470 719 1362 294
Medical Imaging 144 182 134 164 285
Optimal Number of beds
Average number of
beds
Table 11: Optimal number of beds
From this equation, we can analyse the optimal relationship between hospital equipment (prox-
ied by the number of beds) and output levels (as well as input prices). In particular, at the sample
mean for the above variables, we can calculate the optimal number of beds and compare it with
the actual average number of beds in hospitals11. Table 11 shows the results.
Note that the results for Clinical Pathology are not clear cut. In particular, the estimates of
equation (10) at the sample mean for the right hand side variables indicates too low a number of
beds for all models except one (model 1 with no restrictions). Broadly, this appears to indicate
that hospitals are under-dimensioned compared to their optimal level. As for Medical Imaging, the
results are clearer: in all models, the optimal number of beds is lower than the actual number of
beds, which indicates that hospitals are over-dimensioned.
These results should be interpreted with great caution, because the number of beds may not
be a good proxy for hospital equipment. More worringly, we have no way of checking how good a
proxy the number of beds really is. In addition, such caution in the interpretation of the results
should be extended to the case where one views the number of beds as a proxy to the demand
of services internal to the hospital. The optimal number of beds in the hospital is determined by
expected activity. It is obvious that Clinical Pathology, Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine
and Rehabilitation are not the main drivers to bed needs in the hospital. Still, the exercise we
propose provides useful information. Suppose the optimal bed size for Clinical Pathology is one
tenth of actual bed size of the hospital. Then, e¢ ciency of Clinical Pathology services would advise
to have several departments within the hospital. On the reverse, if the optimal bed size indicated
by this exercise is three times the real hospital bed size, their e¢ ciency would be achieved by having
the department of one hospital serving several hospitals in the same geographic region (a feature
that may not be feasible for some hospitals).
4.3 Elasticities
From equation (6), we can calculate the own and cross-price elasticities of factor demands, where
"ii represents the own-price elasticity of input i and "ij represents the cross-price elasticity of input
i with respect to the price of input j :
11We have not calculated the optimal number of beds for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation because of the poor
results obtained when evaluating the estimated cost function at the sample mean - see Section 4.1.
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(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homotheti
c
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data - no
dummies -
homotheti
c
Input
Wages -0.46 -0.41 -0.52 -0.53
Other -0.40 -0.36 -0.45 -0.46
Wages -0.13 -0.14 -0.32 -0.28
Other -0.27 -0.29 -0.65 -0.58
Wages -0.10 -0.09 -0.34 -0.38
Other -0.35 -0.32 -1.20 -1.34
Own price elasticities
Clinical Pathology
Medical Imaging
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
Table 12: Own price elasticities of inputs
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
Clinical Pathology 0.46 0.41 0.52 0.53
Medical Imaging 0.13 0.14 0.32 0.28
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 0.10 0.09 0.34 0.38
Cross price elasticities (labour-other)
Table 13: Cross price elasticities of inputs
"ii =
@xi
@wi
wi
xi
=
ii + S
2
i   Si
Si
(12)
"ij =
@xi
@wj
wj
xi
=
ij + SiSj
Si
(13)
where Si and Sj represent the cost shares of inputs i and j respectively and ii and ij are
the estimated coe¢ cients from equation (4). Tables 12 and 13 present the elasticities evaluated at
the sample mean. As we can see, all the own-price elasticities are negative for all specialties and
they are also below 1, which suggests that factor demands are inelastic. The own-price elasticity of
labour is much larger in Clinical Pathology than in Medical Imaging and in Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation. This immediately suggests that there may be a higher degree of substitutability
between inputs in Clinical Pathology than in the other two specialties. Finally, the own-price
elasticity of labour is lowest in Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, which makes sense as it is
a labour-intensive specialty and it may not be easy to substitute labour with other inputs. The
cross-price elasticities are all positive, which indicates that the inputs are substitutes.
A more direct way of gauging the substitution possibilities between inputs is to calculate the
Allen cross-elasticities of substitution, which are given by ij :
ij =
"ij
Sj
(14)
Table 14 shows that the estimated elasticities of substitution (evaluated at the sample mean) do
not vary much across models for Clinical Pathology. By contrast, there is a much more pronounced
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(1) SUR -
Pooled data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
Clinical Pathology 0.86 0.77 0.97 0.98
Medical Imaging 0.40 0.43 0.97 0.86
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 0.44 0.42 1.53 1.71
Allen cross elasticities of substitution (labour-other)
Table 14: Elasticities of substitution
variation across the estimates for the other two specialties, particularly for Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation12.
In summary, the own- and cross-price elasticities take on plausible values across models for the
various services and the elasticity of substitution shows that, although possible to an extent, there
are limits to the possibilities that an hospital has in substituting its labour input by other inputs
(e.g. equipment). Again, this is what we would expect.
4.4 Economies of scope
Economies of scope are said to exist if the joint costs of producing the various outputs are lower
than the cost of producing those outputs separately. For instance, in a three-output case, overall
economies of scope (ES) are given by:
ES =
C (y1; 0; 0) + C (0; y2; 0) + C (0; 0; y3)  C (y1; y2; y3)
C (y1; y2; y3)
(15)
As Vita (1990) points out, one could evaluate this expression using the estimated costs function.
However, exible cost functions such as the one in equation (4) do not typically provide plausible
cost estimates when evaluated at zero output levels. Therefore, Vita (1990) tests for the existence
of weak cost complementarities (WCC) at the point of approximation of the cost function. The
advantage of this method, as Vita (1990) notes, is that weak cost complementarities are a su¢ cient
condition for economies of scope to exist. Following Vita (1990), weak cost complementarities exist
if the following expression is negative:
Cij =
@2C
@yi@yj
= Cvij + CvjK :
@k
@yj
=
@2V C
@yi@yj
+
@2V C
@yj@k
@k
@yj
(16)
where the latter decomposition is due to Cowing and Holtmann (1983). If @k

@yj
> 0; then k
is a normal input and a su¢ cient condition for Cij to be negative is that Cvij = @
2V C
@yi@yj
< 0 and
12This result is not totally surprising because of the poor results obtained when evaluating the estimated cost
function at the sample mean - see Section 4.1.
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Weak Cost
Complemen-
tarities
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies
- homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
z
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
- no
dummies -
homothetic
z
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
z
(2) SUR -
Pooled data
- no
dummies -
homothetic
Outputs: # occasions # occasions
1 and 2 -0.063 0.024 -0.163 -0.058 0.012 0.013 0.018 0.014 2 0
1 and 3 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.028 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.021 0 0
1 and 4 0.077 0.071 0.253 0.289 -0.001 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 0 0
1 and 5 0.027 0.045 0.080 0.128 -0.017 -0.025 -0.051 -0.066 0 0
1 and 6 -0.029 -0.022 -0.026 -0.008 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009 4 0
1 and 7 0.030 0.038 -0.006 -0.006 -0.033 -0.034 -0.085 -0.090 2 2
2 and 3 -0.010 -0.004 -0.031 -0.027 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.021 4 0
2 and 4 -0.002 0.015 -0.027 0.008 -0.001 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 2 2
2 and 5 -0.004 0.000 0.001 0.005 -0.017 -0.025 -0.051 -0.066 2 2
2 and 6 -0.009 -0.008 -0.013 -0.014 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009 4 0
2 and 7 -0.003 -0.003 0.014 0.009 -0.033 -0.034 -0.085 -0.090 2 2
3 and 4 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.029 -0.027 0 0
3 and 5 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.017 -0.025 -0.051 -0.066 0 0
3 and 6 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009 1 0
3 and 7 -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.033 -0.034 -0.085 -0.090 4 4
4 and 5 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 -0.017 -0.025 -0.051 -0.066 0 0
4 and 6 -0.003 0.000 -0.011 -0.006 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009 3 0
4 and 7 0.007 0.004 0.021 0.018 -0.033 -0.034 -0.085 -0.090 0 0
5 and 6 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.022 0.013 0.017 0.009 4 0
5 and 7 -0.002 0.000 -0.005 -0.004 -0.033 -0.034 -0.085 -0.090 4 4
6 and 7 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.033 -0.034 -0.085 -0.090 4 4
C vij CvjK
C vij <0 and C vjK <0 or C vjK insig A
B C
C vij <0 and C vjK <0
Table 15: Weak Cost Complementarities - Clinical Pathology
CvjK =
@2V C
@yj@k
< 0: Again following Vita (1990), for the former to be veried, it must be true that
ij + ij < 0 (parameters in equation (4)); for the latter to be true, Kj < 0 must be veried.
Tables 15, 16 and 17 present the estimates of Cvij and CvjK for all possible output combinations
and for Clinical Pathology, Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation respectively.
The column further to the right in each of those Tables assesses the number of occasions (or models)
for which the more stringent criteria that both Cvij and CvjK are negative is veried; by contrast,
the penultimate column assesses the number of occasions (or models) in which Cvij < 0 and
CvjK is negative or insignicant, which constitutes a more relaxed criteria to evaluate weak cost
complementarities.
Starting with Clinical Pathology (Table 15), and if we lend more credibility to the results ob-
tained under no restrictions (models 1 and 2) and require that the more stringent criteria is met in
both models, the following combinations of outputs appear to exhibit weak cost complementarities:
outputs 2 and 4 (clinical hemathology and clinical microbiology), outputs 3 and 7 (immunology
and clinical hematology/hematoncology), outputs 5 and 7 (endocrinology and clinical hematol-
ogy/hematoncology) and outputs 6 and 7 (virology and clinical hematology/hematoncology). Note
that output 1, clinical chemistry, does not appear to exhibit any cost complementarities with the
other outputs. This suggests that this output could be produced independently within each hospi-
tal, without a¤ecting the overall cost of Clinical Pathology.
Following the same approach for Medical Imaging (Table 16), the following output combinations
appear to exhibit weak cost complementarities: outputs 1 and 4 (radiology and computed tomog-
raphy), outputs 2 and 4 (angiography and computed tomography), outputs 2 and 5 (angiography
and ultrasonography), outputs 3 and 4 (mamography and computed tomography), outputs 3 and
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Weak Cost
Complemen-
tarities
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
(1) SUR -
Fixed
effects
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Fixed effects
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
z
(1) SUR -
Fixed
effects
z
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
z
(2) SUR -
Fixed
effects
Outputs: # occasions # occasions
1 and 2 0.037 0.060 0.118 0.180 0.017 0.025 0.012 0.020 0 0
1 and 3 0.024 0.057 0.079 0.133 -0.005 0.005 -0.025 -0.007 0 0
1 and 4 -0.031 -0.111 -0.229 -0.453 -0.007 -0.016 -0.001 -0.008 4 4
1 and 5 0.006 0.011 -0.038 -0.072 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 2 2
1 and 6 0.018 0.035 0.062 0.111 -0.035 -0.048 -0.047 -0.065 0 0
2 and 3 -0.001 0.002 0.014 0.025 -0.005 0.005 -0.025 -0.007 1 1
2 and 4 -0.005 -0.012 -0.054 -0.103 -0.007 -0.016 -0.001 -0.008 4 4
2 and 5 -0.021 -0.031 -0.052 -0.074 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 4 4
2 and 6 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.012 -0.035 -0.048 -0.047 -0.065 0 0
3 and 4 -0.002 -0.014 -0.039 -0.074 -0.007 -0.016 -0.001 -0.008 4 4
3 and 5 -0.005 -0.005 -0.016 -0.024 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 4 4
3 and 6 0.009 0.007 0.014 0.015 -0.035 -0.048 -0.047 -0.065 0 0
4 and 5 0.000 -0.005 0.023 0.042 -0.007 -0.003 -0.016 -0.011 1 1
4 and 6 -0.011 -0.022 -0.061 -0.093 -0.035 -0.048 -0.047 -0.065 4 4
5 and 6 0.019 0.030 0.038 0.051 -0.035 -0.048 -0.047 -0.065 0 0
C vij CvjK
C vij <0 and C vjK <0 or C vjK insig A
B C
C vij <0 and C vjK <0
Table 16: Weak Cost Complementarities - Medical Imaging
Weak Cost
Complemen-
tarities
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
(1) SUR -
Fixed
effects
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Fixed effects
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
z
(1) SUR -
Fixed
effects
z
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
z
(2) SUR -
Fixed
effects
Outputs: # occasions # occasions
1 and 2 -0.041 -0.043 -0.010 -0.016 -0.017 -0.012 0.001 0.001 4 2
1 and 3 -0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.022 0.015 0.020 0.008 2 0
1 and 4 0.006 0.008 -0.002 -0.003 -0.013 -0.007 -0.028 -0.021 2 2
1 and 5 0.000 0.003 -0.004 -0.006 0.014 0.006 0.031 0.020 2 0
2 and 3 -0.014 -0.016 -0.003 -0.003 0.022 0.015 0.020 0.008 4 0
2 and 4 -0.023 -0.017 -0.033 -0.037 -0.013 -0.007 -0.028 -0.021 4 4
2 and 5 -0.030 -0.032 -0.037 -0.040 0.014 0.006 0.031 0.020 4 0
3 and 4 -0.005 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.028 -0.021 4 4
3 and 5 -0.002 -0.003 -0.009 -0.008 0.014 0.006 0.031 0.020 4 0
4 and 5 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.014 0.006 0.031 0.020 0 0
C vij CvjK
C vij <0 and C vjK <0 or C vjK insig A
B C
C vij <0 and C vjK <0
Table 17: Weak Cost Complementarities - Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
5 (mamography and ultrasonography), and outputs 4 and 6 (computed tomography and magnetic
resonance imaging). From the output description presented in Table 1, it is worth pointing out
here that output 4 - Computed tomography - appears to exhibit weak cost complementarities with
all other outputs except output 5 - Ultrasonography. This cost complementarity could be due to
the fact that either some of the equipment or some of the sta¤ working in the production of that
output is also used (generating cost e¢ ciencies) in the production of all other outputs except output
5 (ultrasonography).
For Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (Table 17), and using the same criteria outlined
above, there appear to exist weak cost complementarities between outputs 2 and 4 (physical therapy
and occupational therapy) and outputs 3 and 4 (hydro-kinesiotherapy and occupation therapy).
Outputs 1 and 5, electrotherapy and speech and language therapy respectively, do not exhibit any
cost complementarities. This suggests, as observed above, that these outputs could be produced
independently within the hospital without a¤ecting the overall costs of Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation.
The ndings reported above have implications for outsourcing decisions. Outsourcing speech
and language therapy, for example, has less implications for costs of other activities than outsourc-
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ing occupational therapy. Due to cost complementarities, outsourcing occupational therapy alone
would increase average costs in physical therapy and hydro-kinesiotherapy. Outsourcing speech and
language therapy keeps other costs unchanged. The same line of reasoning can be applied to the
other services.
4.5 Other observations
The results for Clinical Pathology (Table 3) and Medical Imaging (Table 4) suggests that smaller
hospitals (district and level 1 hospitals) have lower costs, even after adjusting for output production,
input prices and other factors, such as the casemix. Therefore, ceteris paribus, and for a given scale
of production, producing in those hospitals is less expensive than producing in larger (central)
hospitals. This raises important questions which go beyond the identication of economies of scale.
Coase (1937), when discussing the limits of rm size13, observes that as rms get larger, the costs
of organizing additional transactions within the rm may increase and that managers may fail to
make the best use of the production factors (ine¢ ciency). Both factors may explain why a single
rm does not carry out all production and why outsourcing becomes a reasonable decision once a
certain scale of production is reached.
In this context, and at the very least, our results indicate that the way in which production
is organized in smaller hospitals yields lower costs for a given scale of production. Alternatively,
our results suggest that central hospitals may have surpassed their optimal size and are thus facing
diminishing returns to management(Coase (1937)). If outsourcing were to be decided, these hos-
pitals would be the more likely candidates to benet from using the market as a resource allocation
mechanism. Or, alternatively, it would make sense to create smaller but independent prodution
centres within larger hospitals, which could thus better replicate the (lower cost) organization of
production of smaller hospitals.
5 Conclusion
This paper has addressed a yet under-researched topic: the provision of services within hospitals,
particularly auxiliary clinical services. Because such services have a signicant weight in total
hospital costs, a proper analysis of their cost structure is warranted. In particular, it is important
to analyse the arguments which should underly the make-or-buy decisions that hospitals must
make regarding the provision of these services. Clearly, the possible existence of economies of scale
and scope is essential in order to understand whether hospitals are better o¤ through in-house
production or through outsourcing.
We estimate a exible cost function (generalized translog cost function) for the three most im-
portant (cost-wise) diagnostic techniques and therapeutic services in Portuguese hospitals (Clinical
13Coase (1937), pp. 394-395.
23
Pathology, Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation) and nd there to be ray
economies of scale in all of them, i.e. as we increase the quantity produced of each individual out-
put, costs increase less than proportionally. We also nd that there is some evidence of economies of
scope for some of the services provided within each category, but not for all of them. This suggests
that some services could be provided independently (or outsourced) within each hospital without
a¤ecting overall costs. For Clinical Pathology, we nd that hospitals are under-dimensioned, i.e.
they have too little medical equipment for the output they produce, whilst the reverse is true for
Medical Imaging: hospitals appear to be over-dimensioned.
These results should be viewed as a contribution to the ongoing discussion of where and how
should hospitals provide these services. Not only do they allow us to assess the optimal hospital
dimension for the provision of such auxiliary clinical services, but they also, and at the very least,
allow us to gauge the possible cost savings which could arise from aggregating production in fewer
hospitals. Moreover, the Portuguese Health Service allows hospitals to outsource particular services
(within the hospitalspremises) to public or private contractors. If economies of scale exist, such a
contractor could aggregate larger output levels and take advantage of them. However, and to the
best of our knowledge, no Portuguese hospital has ever made use of this possibility.
Naturally, further research is needed. Whilst we have beneted from a particularly rich dataset
in terms of number of variables, it is also true that we have used a relatively low number of observa-
tions because there are not too many hospitals in Portugal (less than 100) and because we have only
used data for 2002-2006 (5 years). The estimation of exible cost functions imposes great demands
on the data because of the large number of explanatory variables used. Moreover, our analysis
has not considered a separate strand of the literature which has emerged in the last few years:
potential ine¢ ciencies in hospital production. And it has also not considered the changes which
have occurred in the way hospitals are reimbursed in Portugal. These, and other considerations,
are likely to be the next steps in our research.
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Clinical Pathology
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
- no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies
- homothetic
0.1 1.11 1.10 1.37 1.31
0.07 1.06 1.08 1.35 1.31
0.05 1.02 1.05 1.32 1.30
0.03 0.96 1.02 1.29 1.29
0.01 0.92 0.99 1.23 1.26
RTSl
Table 18: Sensitivity Analysis - Returns to scale - Clinical Pathology
Medical Imaging
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
- no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
0.1 1.34 1.10 1.30 1.07
0.07 1.40 1.15 1.39 1.15
0.05 1.45 1.20 1.47 1.20
0.03 1.52 1.26 1.55 1.26
0.01 1.60 1.34 1.66 1.35
RTSl
Table 19: Sensitivity Analysis - Returns to scale - Medical Imaging
A Appendix - Sensitivity analysis
Because of the large number of 0-output observations, we have chosen to use the Box-Cox metric
instead of the log metric in equation (4). However, the output variable transformation depends
crucially on ; the Box-Cox parameter. We have used  = 0:1 in our analysis and in this appendix
we analyse the sensitivity of our results with respect to this parameter.
Tables 18, 19 and 20 reproduce the estimation of RTS, the returns to scale estimate outlined
in equation (7), evaluated at the sample mean, with di¤erent values of  for Clinical Pathology,
Medical Imaging and Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation respectively.
As we can see, the estimates of RTS for Clinical Pathology and Medical Imaging are rather
robust for models 1 and 2, with or without restrictions. With few exceptions (low values of  for
Clinical Pathology in model 1), all results conrm the existence of scale economies in these two
specialties. The results for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation conrm our earlier concerns: the
estimates for RTS are very sensitive both to the estimation model as well as the Box-Cox parameter
 used. In almost all cases, the estimates vary widely. As explained earlier, this is probably due to
the fact that we are evaluating the cost function away from the approximation point.
We follow a similar approach to estimate own-price elasticities for the labour input for di¤erent
values of : Tables 21, 22 and 23 show that these estimates do not vary much with ; which reassures
us that the Box-Cox parameter used in the estimation is unlikely to have a¤ected our results.
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Physical
Medicine and
Rehabilitation (1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies
- homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
0.1 97.20 7.71 -0.48 -2.45
0.07 4.29 2.96 -0.48 -3.10
0.05 3.33 2.51 -0.48 -3.21
0.03 3.25 2.44 -0.46 -3.00
0.01 3.73 2.59 -0.43 -2.63
RTSl
Table 20: Sensitivity Analysis - Returns to scale - Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
Clinical Pathology
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies
- homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
0.1 -0.46 -0.41 -0.52 -0.53
0.07 -0.45 -0.41 -0.52 -0.53
0.05 -0.45 -0.40 -0.52 -0.53
0.03 -0.44 -0.40 -0.52 -0.53
0.01 -0.43 -0.39 -0.52 -0.53
Own-price elasticity - Wagesl
Table 21: Sensitivity analysis - Own-price elasticity (wages) - Clinical Pathology
Medical Imaging
(1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data
- no
dummies -
homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
0.1 -0.13 -0.14 -0.32 -0.28
0.07 -0.14 -0.14 -0.31 -0.28
0.05 -0.14 -0.14 -0.31 -0.28
0.03 -0.15 -0.14 -0.31 -0.28
0.01 -0.15 -0.15 -0.30 -0.28
Own-price elasticity - Wagesl
Table 22: Sensitivity analysis - Own-price elasticity (wages) - Medical Imaging
Physical
Medicine and
Rehabilitation (1) SUR -
Pooled
data
(1) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies
- homothetic
(2) SUR -
Pooled
data
(2) SUR -
Pooled data -
no dummies -
homothetic
0.1 -0.10 -0.09 -0.34 -0.38
0.07 -0.10 -0.09 -0.33 -0.38
0.05 -0.09 -0.09 -0.33 -0.38
0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.33 -0.38
0.01 -0.09 -0.08 -0.33 -0.38
Own-price elasticity - Wagesl
Table 23: Sensitivity analysis - Own-price elasticity (wages) - Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
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